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TORT LAW
I. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO WEAR A SEAT BELT DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In Keaton v. Pearson' the Supreme Court of South Carolina
reversed a trial court's judgment on the ground that the jury
should not have been allowed to hear testimony regarding plain-
tiff's failure to wear a seat belt. In remanding the case for a new
trial, the court held that "in the absence of an affirmative statu-
tory duty, a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt does not consti-
tute contributory negligence or a pre-injury failure to minimize
damages."2
By reversing the order of the lower court, the supreme court
formally rejected the use of the "seat belt defense ' 3 in simple
automobile collision cases, thus placing South Carolina among
the majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue.4
The holding also effectively overrules two earlier South Carolina
cases, Sams v. Sams5 and Jones v. Dague,e which strongly indi-
1. 292 s.c. 579, 358 S.E.2d 141 (1987).
2. Id. at 580, 358 S.E.2d at 141.
3. The "seat belt defense" has been described as follows:
The so-called "seat belt defense" relieves the negligent defendant in an auto-
mobile injury case from liability for those injuries to the plaintiff which would
not have occurred had plaintiff used an available seat belt. Thus, where a pas-
senger is thrown against the windshield and injured in an accident, he may not
recover for those injuries if the defendant shows by expert testimony that use
of a seat belt would have prevented the passenger from hitting the windshield.
Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A Comprehensive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Sug-
gested Approach for the Courts, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272, 272 n.1 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla.
1984); Note, supra note 3, at 272; Comment, The Seat Belt Defense: Must the Reasona-
ble Man Wear a Seat Belt?, 50 Mo. L. REv. 968 (1985).
5. 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966) (in passenger's action against automobile
driver for personal injury, court held that the portion of defendant's pleading, asserting
that plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt contributed to the proximate cause of her inju-
ries, should not be stricken).
6. 252 S.C. 261, 166 S.E.2d 99 (1969) (in wrongful death action arising from an
automobile accident, court held that the defense of contributory negligence, based on
plaintiff's failure to wear an available seat belt, was properly stricken; the court noted,
however, that there were no facts that indicated that the wearing of a seat belt would
have prevented plaintiff's death).
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cated that a seat belt defense would be proper under certain
circumstances.7
The parties in Keaton were involved in a minor automobile
collision when Pearson attempted to turn left across Keaton's
oncoming lane of traffic. Little property damage resulted from
the accident since both vehicles were traveling at less than fif-
teen miles per hour. Keaton, however, experienced a second col-
lision and was injured when her chin struck the steering wheel.'
Over Keaton's objection, the trial judge allowed Pearson to
elicit testimony that Keaton had not been wearing a seat belt.
The judge also allowed Pearson to introduce expert testimony
demonstrating that if Keaton had been wearing her seat belt,
the second collision would not have occurred. The trial judge
later charged the jury that if they found that Keaton had not
been wearing a seat belt, they could consider "'any causative
relationship between [Keaton's] failure to use a seat belt as this
impacts upon the issue of contributory negligence and a failure
to minimize damages.' ""
In rejecting the seat belt defense, the supreme court rea-
soned that the legislature is the appropriate body to impose a
duty on people to wear a seat belt.'0 To support this reasoning,
the court relied on several similar holdings from other jurisdic-
tions" but merely "recognize[d]" the "suggest[ions]" set forth in
Sams and Jones.1
2
Current law addressing the seat belt defense remains unset-
tled and confused.' 3 Generally, defendants have advanced three
possible theories to support the seat belt defense: 1) the plain-
tiff's failure to use a seat belt constitutes negligence per se, en-
tirely precluding plaintiff from recovery; 2) the plaintiff's nonuse
of a seat belt does not comport with the standard of conduct of a
reasonable man; therefore, the plaintiff is contributorily negli-
7. 292 S.C. at 580, 358 S.E.2d at 141.
8. Id, Plaintiff suffered from temporomandibular joint dysfunction.
9. Id.
10. Id,
11. See Britton v. Doerhing, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Fischer v. Moore,
183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc., 135 Mich.
App. 350, 354 N.W.2d 336 (1984); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
12. 292 S.C. at 580, 358 S.E.2d at 141.
13. See Note, supra note 3, at 272 ("[Failure] to use an available seat belt remains
an unsettled issue in automobile litigation."); Comment, supra note 4, at 968 ("The law
in this area remains unsettled despite the courts' increasing familiarity with the issue.").
[Vol. 40238
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gent; and 3) by not wearing a seat belt, the plaintiff has failed to
mitigate damages and should not be allowed to recover damages
that use of a seat belt could have prevented. 4
The per se theory has been rejected by every court that has
considered it.15 The vast majority of courts also have rejected
the contributory negligence theory.'6 Thus, courts that have ac-
cepted the seat belt defense overwhelmingly have accepted the
mitigation of damages theory.
17
Because of the supreme court's holdings in Sams' and
Jones,19 commentators previously considered South Carolina a
leader in support of the seat belt defense.20 Keaton clearly ne-
gates this presumption. The supreme court followed the view
that any policy decisions concerning seat belts should be de-
ferred to the legislature.2' This position is often criticized be-
cause courts confuse the seat belt defense with mandatory seat
belt usage laws. The basis for this theory is that the seat belt
defense creates no mandatory duty to wear a seat belt. Instead,
the defense only requires seat belt usage if the plaintiff desires
to recover to the full extent of his injuries.22
Although the court failed to discuss South Carolina as a
14. See Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974);
Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense - State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 172, 173 (1970).
15. Comment, supra note 4, at 981.
16. Id. at 983 n.132.
17. E.g., Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984);
Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
18. The Sams court held that an "alleged [seat belt] defense should be decided in
the light of all of the facts and circumstances adduced upon the trial, rather than being
decided simply on the pleadings." 247 S.C. at 470, 148 S.E.2d at 155.
19. The Jones court, implying that the issue may be purely factual, stated that
"[there was a total absence of any fact or circumstance to indicate that the failure of the
deceased to fasten her seat belt contributed in any way to the occurrence of the accident
or that she would not have been injured in the same manner if the seat belt had been
fastened." 252 S.C. at 271, 166 S.E.2d at 103-04.
20. Comment, The Seat Belt Defense - A Valid Instrument of Public Policy, 44
TENN. L. REV. 119, 121 (1976).
21. Other theories commonly advanced for the rejection of the seat belt defense
include: 1) the plaintiff has no duty to predict the defendant's negligence; 2) since seat
belts are not required in all vehicles, the defendant should not be allowed to take advan-
tage of the circumstance that the plaintiff was riding in a car equipped with seat belts; 3)
the majority of motorists do not use seat belts; and 4) the seat belt defense would lead to
a battle of the experts as to what injuries could have been presented by the use of a seat
belt. Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 133, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977).
22. Comment, supra note 4, at 975.
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contributory negligence23 jurisdiction,24 this factor may have in-
fluenced the court's rejection of the seat belt defense. Under the
doctrine of contributory negligence, accepting the seat belt de-
fense would completely bar the plaintiff's recovery.25 Commenta-
tors, however, vehemently argue that jurisdictions adhering to
the doctrine of comparative negligence2 s should adopt the seat
belt defense.27 The commentators reason that the comparative
negligence determination contemplates all relevant factors of an
automobile accident; thus, the unbuckled claimant could only
suffer a reduction in damages.2 8 The adoption of a comparative
negligence standard has caused at least three jurisdictions to ex-
amine and accept the seat belt defense. 9 Currently, only six
23. The rule of contributory negligence is simply that "when a plaintiff's negligence
contributes to the happening of an accident, he cannot recover damages from a defend-
ant who negligently injures him." V. SCHWARTZ, COmPARATIWE NEGLIGENCE § 1.2, at 4 (2d
ed. 1986).
24. Langley v. Boyter, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100 (1985). The supreme court re-
versed the court of appeals holding that comparative negligence was applicable in South
Carolina, thus maintaining South Carolina as a contributory negligence jurisdiction.
25. Miller, The Seat Belt Defense Under Comparative Negligence, 12 IDAHO L.
REV. 59 (1975).
26. The term "comparative negligence" is used to describe "any system of law that
by some method and in some situations apportions costs of an accident, at least in part,
on the basis of the relative fault of the responsible parties." V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23,
at 29.
27. See, e.g., Hoglund & Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty to Wear Seat Belts
Under Comparative Negligence Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1974); Miller, The Seat Belt
Defense Under Comparative Negligence, 12 IDAHO L. REV. 59 (1975); Sullivan, The Seat
Belt Defense Should be Resurrected Under Pure Comparative Negligence, 61 MICH. B.J.
560 (1982).
28. Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 27, at 14.
29. In Hutchens v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194 (Alaska 1986), the Alaska Supreme
Court held that in a simple automobile collision, evidence of the failure to wear a seat
belt is relevant for damage reduction. The court noted that under a comparative negli-
gence standard, "all relevant factors [must be considered] in arriving at the appropriate
damage award and non-use of a seat belt is a relevant factor for apportioning damage."
Id. at 1199.
The Supreme Court of Michigan accepted the seat belt defense in Lowe v. Estate
Motors, Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987), because of that court's adoption of
a comparative negligence standard. Previously, Michigan law was governed by two court
of appeals cases, Selmo v. Baratono, 28 Mich. App. 217, 184 N.W.2d 367 (1970), and
Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969), which had rejected the
seat belt defense when it was used to prove contributory negligence. The court in Lowe
noted that "comparative negligence never allows an otherwise liable defendant to en-
tirely 'avoid' liability and thus 'escape' the duty of due care." 428 Mich. at 460, 410
N.W.2d at 714. Thus, the court held that this "significant difference" warranted the ad-
missibility of seat belt evidence.
4
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states, including South Carolina and the District of Columbia,
still adhere to the contributory negligence standard.30
An important issue that remains unanswered by Keaton is
what effect the decision will have in the area of products liabil-
ity. The defendant in Keaton argued that introduction of a seat
belt defense differed greatly in a products liability action from
that in a simple automobile collision case. In "crashworthiness"
products liability cases, 1 the overall interior safety of the car
should be considered in assessing the motorist's protection from
the second collision.3 2 Naturally, the plaintiff's use or nonuse of
an available seat belt impacts on the overall interior safety of
the car. The great majority of jurisdictions, whether for or
against the seat belt defense, do not distinguish between prod-
ucts liability and collision actions in these instances.3 3 Hence, al-
though declining to address the issue, the court probably would
reject the seat belt defense in products liability actions as well.
In light of Keaton, the seat belt defense likely will not re-
emerge in South Carolina common law without action from the
legislature. The recent enactment of the Department of Trans-
portation's Occupant Crash Protection Rule, 4 however, may
force the legislature to consider a mandatory seat belt usage
law. 5 Until that time, injured South Carolinians will suffer no
In Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 755 P.2d 1135 (1988), the Supreme Court of
Arizona also accepted the seat belt defense in lieu of that state's adoption of a compara-
tive negligence standard. The court rejected the reasoning of an earlier court of appeals
case, Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 521 P.2d 161 (1974), in which the court had
disallowed any seat belt evidence because of the harsh consequences associated with the
contributory negligence standard. The Law court held that comparative negligence elimi-
nated the problems encountered under contributory negligence because "an adverse find-
ing on nonuse does not bar recovery but merely reduces the damages in proportion to the
contributing factor." 157 Ariz. at -, 755 P.2d at 1139.
30. V. ScHwARTz, supra note 23, § 1.5(E), at 25.
31. "The term 'crashworthiness' . . means the protection that a passenger motor
vehicle affords its passengers against personal injury or death as a result of a motor
vehicle accident." Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 n.1
(E.D. Va. 1978).
32. Brief of Respondent at 6.
33. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Marcus, 440 So. 2d 373, 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1986).
34. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1985). This rule would require all American-made cars to
be equipped with automatic protection devices, such as airbags, unless states accounting
for two-thirds of the nation's population enact mandatory seat belt usage laws before
April 1, 1989.
35. Note, The Seat Belt Defense and North Carolina's New Mandatory Usage
19881
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legal penalty for a failure to "buckle up."
James F. Rogers
II. LANDOWNER'S DUTY OF CARE OWED TO INVITEES ON HIs
PROPERTY AND ON ADJACENT PROPERTY
In Israel v. Carolina Bar-B-Que, Inc.36 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals was faced with novel questions regarding a
landowner's duty of care owed to invitees on his property and on
adjacent property. The questions involved the liability of the
landowner on whose property a tree with a rotten limb was
growing and the liability of the adjacent landowner on whose
land the limb fell. In the particular fact situation in Israel, the
adjacent landowner was not liable; under a different fact pat-
tern, however, the court's analysis could invoke liability on both
landowners.
On April 3, 1982, Charlotte Israel was sitting in her car in
the parking area of a drive-in restaurant, Carolina Bar-B-Que,
Inc. (BBQ). Andrew Berry owned the property adjacent to this
parking area. A large limb of a tree located on Berry's. property
fell onto Israel's car in the BBQ lot. Israel's car was "in effect,
totally destroyed. 37 The tree from which the limb fell was lo-
cated about twenty-five to thirty feet from the property line be-
tween Berry and BBQ. Smaller oak trees were located on Berry's
property between the larger oaks and the BBQ parking lot.
These smaller oaks were "described as being bushy,"38 making it
impossible to see the rotten limb in the large oak tree from the
BBQ parking lot.
Israel sued Berry and BBQ for injuries sustained as a result
of the tree limb falling on her car. The jury awarded Israel a
$80,000 verdict against both defendants, but the verdict was re-
duced to $60,000 on postverdict motions for a new trial nisi.-
On appeal the court affirmed the verdict against Berry but re-
versed against BBQ.
The court first addressed the issue of Berry's liability and
Law, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1127, 1128 (1986).
36. 292 S.C. 282, 356 S.E.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1987).
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noted that, under common law, there would be no liability for a
fallen limb.4" The modern approach, however, is to impose a
duty on the landowner to "exercise reasonable care to prevent
an unreasonable risk of harm arising from defective or unsound
trees on his premises.""' This rule, which simply imposes on a
landowner the duty to exercise due care to prevent a risk of
harm from decayed trees, seems reasonable.
Berry was in charge of the property and visited it approxi-
mately fifteen times each week. 2 By a reasonable inspection of
the property, Berry could have detected the rotten limb and
taken precautionary measures that would have prevented
Israel's injury. Berry was in the best position to discover the de-
fective limb and to take steps to alleviate the risk of subsequent
damage the limb might cause. The court followed the modern
trend by adopting this rule.43 The result the court reached was
fair, just, and well-reasoned.
Next, the court addressed the question of BBQ's liability.
The court found that Israel was "BBQ's invitee. ' '44 Under South
Carolina law, since Israel was an invitee, BBQ had a "duty...
to exercise due care to keep the premises in reasonably safe con-
dition and give warning of any latent perils. ' 45 Thus, as the
court correctly stated, "in the absence of negligence on the part
40. Id. at 287-88, 356 S.E.2d at 125 (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEmroN & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 391 (5th ed. 1984)).
41. Id. at 288, 356 S.E.2d at 127 (citing Mahurin v. Lockhart, 71 IM. App. 3d 691,
693, 390 N.E.2d 523, 525 (1979)).
42. Id. at 289, 356 S.E.2d at 127.
43. See, e.g., Dudley v. Meadowbrook, Inc., 166 A.2d 743, 744 (D.C. 1960) ("land-
owner should be held to the duty of common prudence in maintaining his property, in-
cluding trees thereon, in such a way as to prevent injury to his neighbor's property");
Cornett v. Agee, 143 Ga. App. 55, 237 S.E.2d 522 (1977) (tree located on defendant's lot
fell, and the fall was caused by visible rot as well as by high winds; defendant was liable
to plaintiff for destruction of plaintiff's property); Rowe v. McGee, 5 N.C. App. 60, 66,
168 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1969) ("where the defendants knew that the tree on their property
was decayed and liable to fall and to damage the property of [plaintiffs], we think and
hold that the defendants were under a duty to eliminate the danger"); Barker v. Brown,
236 Pa. Super. 75, 81, 340 A.2d 566, 569 (1975) ("possessor of land in or adjacent to a
developed or residential area is subject to liability for harm caused to others outside of
the land by a defect in the condition of a tree thereon, if the exercise of reasonable care
by the possessor: (a) would have disclosed the defect and the risk involved therein, and
(b) would have made it reasonably safe by repair or otherwise").
44. 292 S.C. at 289, 356 S.E.2d at 128.
45. See Turner v. Sinclair Refining Co., 254 S.C. 36, 42, 173 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1970).
1988]
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of BBQ there is no liability."'46 The court, while not establishing
a per se rule, stated that if BBQ was liable, "such liability has to
be premised upon the breach of duty to anticipate a danger
which the landowner knew of or should have known of in the
exercise of reasonable care."
47
BBQ did not know, nor could it have known, of the defec-
tive condition of the large oaks since any view of the large oaks
was blocked by the smaller ones. A reasonable inspection by
BBQ would not have uncovered this danger. There was no way
for BBQ to anticipate that Israel's property was in danger due to
the decayed limb. Based on this reasoning, the court found BBQ
not liable.
Carolina Bar-B-Que is a significant case in that the court
adopted the modern rule that a landowner has a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk of 'harm arising
from trees located on his premises. The landowner now has an
affirmative duty to make reasonable inspections of trees located
on his property. The court could extend this line of reasoning to
other natural objects located on the landowner's premises. The
court also refused to adopt any specific rule with respect to the
landowner's liability when a tree limb from adjacent property
causes damage to a third party on the landowner's property. The
court seemed receptive to the idea that in an invitee situation, if
the landowner knew or should have known by the exercise of
reasonable care of a danger located on a neighbor's land, the
landowner would be liable for damages to a third party for fail-
ing to take reasonable steps to make his property safe for invi-
tees. The court, however, did not adopt a per se rule. The court's
analysis centered on the duties that BBQ owed to Israel as an
invitee.
Luther C. Kissam, IV
III. TORT REMEDY Now AvAILABLE FOR ECONOMIC LOSS DUE
TO ASBESTOS CONTAMINATION
After City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co.,48 plaintiffs
46. 292 S.C. at 289, 356 S.E.2d at 128.
47. Id. at 290, 356 S.E.2d at 128.
48. 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 840 F.2d 219 (1988).
[Vol. 40
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suffering economic loss caused by asbestos contamination have a
remedy in tort, even though no actual physical injuries to per-
sons or property have been suffered. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed a verdict for the city of Greenville in a negli-
gence and breach of warranty action against W.R. Grace & Co.
Although most courts hold that there is no basis for recovery of
purely economic loss in negligence or strict liability,49 the Fourth
Circuit awarded compensation in accordance with the trend al-
lowing such recovery in asbestos contamination and other toxic
tort cases. The court reasoned that asbestos contamination en-
dangered the lives and health of the building occupants. In the
court's opinion, "this is not the type of risk that is normally allo-
cated between the parties to a contract by agreement.
'5 0
The city of Greenville and Greenville Water System (here-
inafter collectively referred to as "Greenville") sued W.R. Grace
& Co. (Grace) to recover the costs of removing and replacing an
asbestos fireproofing product, Monokote5 1 Grace had replaced
its asbestos-containing Monokote with a new asbestos-free
Monokote in 1971; however, the old Monokote was applied to
the steel beams of Greenville City Hall in 1971-72.
Among Grace's several contentions on appeal,52 one conten-
tion in particular warrants special consideration. Grace argued
that Greenville had suffered only economic loss and, therefore,
had no cause of action based on negligence; absent present phys-
ical injury to person or property, no recovery in tort could be
49. See, e.g., Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.
Pa. 1964); Ales-Perati's Foods Int'l v. American Can Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 277, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (1985); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953); Graham v.
John R. Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96, 36 S.W.2d 859 (1931); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders
& Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Berg v. General Motors Corp.,
87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705
(1961).
50. 827 F.2d at 978.
51. Following a jury verdict in favor of Greenville, defendant moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied, and defendant appealed. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court judgment and awarded the plaintiff $4.8 million upon
acceptance of remittitur.
52. Grace argued that the district court erred in denying its j.n.o.v. motion on the
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Monokote was defec-
tive or that Grace knew of the dangers posed, that the award of compensatory damages
was impermissibly speculative and unsupported by evidence, and that the punitive dam-
ages award was unsupported by the evidence and tainted by faulty jury instructions. 827
F.2d at 978, 982.
19881
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awarded.53 The court distinguished the cases Grace relied upon
and concluded that Greenville could recover the costs of remov-
ing the asbestos . 4 The court held that under these circum-
stances, "South Carolina courts would be willing to extend tort
liability to the manufacturer whose product threatens a substan-
tial and unreasonable risk of harm by releasing toxic substances
into the environment."55
Whether or not to allow recovery under tort theories for
purely economic loss has been the subject of much debate and
discussion. This issue developed from the expansion of protec-
tion accorded personal and tangible property interests in prod-
ucts liability actions, which led to the expansion of recovery to
plaintiffs claiming only economic injury. Among the various
theories of recovery, "negligence has proved to be among the
least fruitful avenues of recovery for economic loss. '57 Indeed,
the majority of courts continue to deny negligence recovery for
economic or pecuniary loss.58
53. Id. at 976-77. In support of its contention, Grace relied on East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986), and 2000 Watermark Ass'n v.
Celotex Corp,, 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1986).
54, The court distinguished these cases by pointing out that the defective products
injured only themselves. Thus, there was no claim of injury or threat of injury to persons
or property. 827 F.2d at 977. In Grace, however, there existed a threat of future harm to
persons.
55. Id. at 978. The court cited the following in support of its decision: Spartanburg
County School Dist. Seven v. National Gypsum Corp., No. 83-1744-14, slip op. (D.S.C.
July 29, 1985); Greenville County School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 82-3142-14, slip
op. (D.S.C. July 29, 1985); Lexington County School Dist. Five v. United States Gypsum
Co., No. 82-2072-0, slip op. (D.S.C. April 2, 1984); Spartanburg County School Dist. Six
v. National Gypsum Co., No. 83-CP-42-1756, slip op. (S.C. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 1984).
56. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
916, 918 (1966).
57. Id. at 929. "Historically ... the only tort action available to a disappointed
purchaser suffering intangible commercial loss has been the tort action.., for fraud and
the only contract action has been for breach of a warranty, express or implied. This
remains the generally accepted view." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 101, at 708 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote
omitted).
58. See R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983);
County of Westchester v. General Motors Corp., 555 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
States S.S. Co. v. Stone Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J. 1973); Seely
v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965)
("distinction . . . between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for
economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having an
accident causing physical injury"); Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445
So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1983); TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284
10
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Conversely, a substantial minority of jurisdictions have al-
lowed recovery in negligence for purely economic loss.5 9 Allow-
ance of such recovery is attributable to policy considerations for
the extension of manufacturer's liability in products liability
cases generally. 0 The courts also consider that economic and
other losses are not readily distinguishable." In Seely v. White
Motor Co.12 a strong dissent argued that no real distinction can
be drawn: "'Overwhelming misfortunes' might occur more often
in personal injury cases than in property damage or economic
loss cases . . .but this is no reason to draw the line between
these types of injury when a more sensible line [may be]
available.
'63
The trend allowing for recovery has been recognized in a va-
riety of products liability cases. The specialized area of toxic
torts has been one in which courts have readily recognized eco-
nomic recovery on negligence principles. For example, the
Fourth Circuit in Grace cited four unpublished cases supporting
its ruling that property owners' claims for asbestos contamina-
tion of their builders are actionable in tort." Extensive attention
was given to this issue in City of Manchester v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 5 in which the city brought an action against the manu-
facturers and sellers of asbestos products for damages associated
with the placement, removal, and replacement of asbestos prod-
ucts in public buildings. The defendant, National Gypsum Co.,
took the same stance in that case as Grace in arguing that plain-
tiffs seeking recovery in tort cannot recover purely economic
loss.66 The court proceeded to analyze and justify its ruling in a
more in depth, systematic manner than did the Fourth Circuit
(Sup. Ct. 1955); R. CARTWRIGHT & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LAmLrry § 2.20, at 181-82
(1986) ("Such losses are considered to be distinct from property damage, which is char-
acterized by its direct, accidental nature" and "to allow such recovery would be emascu-
late to relevant provisions of the U.C.C.").
59. See cases cited supra note 49.
60. Note, supra note 56, at 950. The policy considerations include deterrence of
unreasonably dangerous products, allocation of risk, and freedom of contract under the
Uniform Commercial Code.
61. R. CARTWRIGHT & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 58, at 209.
62. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
63. Id. at 25, 403 P.2d at 155, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (emphasis in original) (Peters, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
64. 827 F.2d at 978.
65. 637 F. Supp. 646 (D.R.I. 1986).
66. Id. at 649.
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and held in the plaintiff's favor.6 7 The court reasoned that it was
"somewhat artificial to try to characterize the damage plaintiff
claims as either. . . physical damage to its property or economic
damage. ' ' 68 Whether or not plaintiff suffered physical harm was
predicated on the nature of the defect and the manner in which
the damages occurred.0
As in City of Manchester, Grace's products posed a sub-
stantial risk of personal injury to those people who occupied the
building in which the product was located. The manufacturer
should bear the responsibility for guarding against such threats
of personal harm and property damage and the cost of replacing
the product to eliminate the risk.70 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's
award of damages to the plaintiff in this instance is correct.
Several questions will emanate from this decision and prob-
ably will arise in future litigation. Is there any justifiable distinc-
tion between economic losses and other losses? Will the manu-
facturer be held responsible for any loss remotely resembling an
"injury" to property or person if such recovery is allowed for
mere negligence? Will allowing recovery for purely economic
losses in tort have any effect on an individual plaintiff's ability
to sue for actual physical harm which results in the future?
The questions are limitless, and one can anticipate the in-
flux of claims in the field of toxic torts, an area of the law al-
ready inundated with thousands of claims by property owners,
individuals, and the like:
[F]ear has been expressed that a general liability for negli-
67. The court began its analysis by assuming that New Hampshire did not allow
recovery in tort, but in contract, for purely economic loss. Then the question became
whether the plaintiff had made a sufficient allegation of "property" damage so as to state
a claim in tort. Id.
68. Id. The court cited several toxic tort cases that address this issue: Pearl v. Al-
lied Corp., 566 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ. v. U.S.
Gypsum, 552 F. Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 1982); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F.
Supp. 962 (D. Ariz. 1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915
(1977). 637 F. Supp. at 650.
69. City of Manchester, 637 F. Supp. at 651; see also Pennsylvania Glass Sand v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
70. The court in Pennsylvania Glass Sand noted that "[tihis does not mean...
that every prayer for relief that seeks the cost of repairing a damaged product entails the
type of economic loss traditionally encompassed within warranty law." 652 F.2d at 1169;
accord Town of Hooksett School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126, 131
(D.C.N.H. 1984) ("That the measure of the Plaintiff's damages is economic does not
transform the nature of his injury into a strictly economic loss.").
[Vol. 40
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gently-inflicted economic loss will expose the merely careless
defendant to "liability in an indeterminate amount... to an
indeterminate class"; the possible economic loss that may
foreseeably and "proximately" result form any negligent act
may be so varying as to create . . . liability inordinate to the
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to the value of the
interest sought to be protected.
71
The court established a sound rule of law, allowing recovery
for economic loss when a substantial threat of harm to persons
or property is present, but any attempt to apply this rule
blindly, without thoroughly considering the facts and circum-
stances, may result in a great injustice to the merely negligent
defendant.
Lynda G. Wilson
IV. "STEP IN THE DARK" RULE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
REJECTED IN PERSONAL INJURY SUIT
Blanton v. Stokes Manufactured Homes72 presented a novel
issue to South Carolina courts. For the first time they were
asked to interpret the "step in the dark" rule of contributory
negligence. The court of appeals' decision should have signifi-
cant impact on future personal injury suits when the injury has
occurred, at least in part, because of improper lighting.
Blanton, the plaintiff, was an independent contractor en-
gaged by Stokes Manufactured Homes (Stokes), the defendant,
to clean newly delivered mobile homes in preparation for poten-
tial buyers. Blanton was injured after entering a darkened mo-
bile home from the bright outdoors to begin cleaning; she
tripped over a bundle of roofing shingles that she could not see
on the floor. At trial Stokes argued the "step in the dark" rule73
71. Note, supra note 56, at 944-45 (footnotes omitted).
72. 293 S.C. 156, 359 S.E.2d 94 (Ct. App. 1987).
73. The Florida Supreme Court defined the "step in the dark" rules as follows:
A person who comes into an unfamiliar situation, where a condition of dark-
ness renders the use of his eyesight ineffective tb define his surroundings, is
not justified, in the absence of any special stress of circumstances, in proceed-
ing further, without first finding out where he is going and what may be the
obstructions to his safe progress. Violation of that rule is contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law.
Rubey v. William Morris, Inc., 66 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 1953) (citations omitted).
1988] 249
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upon its directed verdict and postverdict motions. The motions
were overruled, and Stokes appealed from a jury verdict for the
defendant. The court of appeals affirmed.
The court expressly rejected the defendant's proposed rule,
finding it broad and unqualified. Instead, it turned for guidance
to a general summary of the pertinent law contained in Ameri-
can Law Reports Third.74 The summary lists several factors
bearing on the issue of contributory negligence, leading the court
to believe, erroneously, that the determination of the applicabil-
ity of a "step in the dark" rule properly was left for the jury.
If the court had read further in the annotation it would
have discovered the following passage:
In addition to this general rule, [cited by the Blanton court]
the courts in a number of cases have made other statements or
set forth special rules as to proceeding in the dark as contribu-
tory negligence.
The most famous rule is the step-in-the-dark rule....
The step-in-the-dark rule is not an absolute rule of law. It
is merely a specialized example of certain circumstances in
which reasonable minds can not differ on the standard of care
to be exercised by a plaintiff.75
In other words, absent special circumstances, a plaintiff pro-
ceeding in the dark is contributorily negligent as a matter of law,
and the issue of contributory negligence is submitted to a jury
only in cases when the facts do not fit squarely within the rule
or somehow render the rule inapplicable. 6 Case law supports the
proposition that the "step-in-the-dark" rule raises an inference
of negligence that may then be rebutted by evidence to create a
factual issue. 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court separated the rule into three
essential elements: (1) plaintiff must enter an area which is un-
familiar to him; (2) the area must be in total darkness or at least
the plaintiff must be unable to see; and (3) there must be an
absence of special circumstances that would prevent application
74. Annotation, Premises Liability: Proceeding in the Dark Across Interior Prem-
ises as Contributory Negligence, 28 A.L.R.3D 605, 614 (1969).
75. Id. at 616 (footnotes omitted).
76. Id. at 616-17.
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of the rule. 8
In the case at bar, the premises were unfamiliar. Although
Blanton had cleaned other mobile homes, she had never cleaned
the particular one involved in this case, and floor plans for the
homes varied. 79 The second element is also satisfied, according
to Blanton's own testimony.
Finally, there were no special circumstances to prevent ap-
plication of the rule. The court placed undue weight on the fact
that previously the roofing shingles always had been stored in
the closet, so that Stokes, therefore, had a duty to warn. In do-
ing so, the court underplayed other key facts such as Blanton's
failure to wear her glasses, without which she is not licensed to
drive, 0 and her discovery, more than once, of furniture scattered
and turned upside down in the mobile homes.8 ' Blanton's prior
experience should have given her ample reason not to proceed
without investigation, assistance, or, at the very least, waiting
until her eyes adjusted to the dark.
It is not clear from the court's language whether it intended
to reject the notion of a "step in the dark" rule altogether or
merely to reduce its potency to a matter of fact for the jury,
which ultimately produces the same result. If appealed, the su-
preme court should recognize the error of the court of appeals in
denying Stokes' motions and find Blanton contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law.
Kim Scimg
V. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUBMIT ISSUE OF
TELEVISION LIBEL AND SLANDER TO JURY
In Wilhoit v. WCSC, Inc.8 2 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals addressed a novel issue in the area of television libel and
slander. The court held that the plaintiff was defamed when the
defendant aired a film clip of the plaintiff along with a broadcast
announcing the embezzlement sentencing of someone other than
78. Mourning v. Interlachen Country Club, 280 Minn. 94, 97, 158 N.W.2d 244, 246
(1968).
79. Record at 22.
80. Id. at 15-16.
81. Id. at 9.
82. 293 S.C. 34, 358 S.E.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1987).
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the plaintiff. In finding defamation, the court adhered to well-
established principles followed in a majority of jurisdictions.
Juanita Wilhoit testified as a character witness for Barbara
Koester, who pleaded guilty to bank embezzlement. A reporter
from television station WCSC, Inc. (WCSC) confronted Wilhoit
after she testified. Wilhoit told the reporter she was not Koester,
but a cameraman nevertheless filmed her with her face covered
by her hands. That night, WCSC broadcast the film of Wilhoit
simultaneously with the story about Koester's sentencing. The
story was aired five times. Wilhoit subsequently sued both
WCSC and the reporter for defamation. The jury returned a ver-
dict for the plaintiff of $1 actual damages and $45,000 punitive
damages. The court of appeals affirmed.s3
The court, recognizing these issues of first impression in
South Carolina, addressed WCSC's arguments (1) that the
broadcast was not of and concerning Wilhoit and (2) that Wil-
hoit failed to offer any evidence that a third party understood
the broadcast to refer to her.
First, the court relied on a West Virginia case in deciding
the broadcast was of and concerning plaintiff. In Crump v.
Beckley Newspapers, Inc.84 a West Virginia court established
the principle that libel may be perpetrated not only from writ-
ten communication but also by publication of pictures and pho-
tographs.85 The Crump court stated, "'Whether a written de-
famatory statement refers to a particular plaintiff, normally, is a
question of fact for a jury.'. . . [E]ven if the alleged defamatory
material refers to another, if the implication is one of identity,
the plaintiff may recover. 8 81 Based solely on these principles and
on the evidence presented, the South Carolina court held that
the issue was properly submitted to the jury,8 7 which could then
determine whether the broadcast concerned Wilhoit.
With respect to whether the broadcast amounted to a publi-
cation to a third party who understood the broadcast to refer to
Wilhoit, the court again allowed the question to go to the jury.
83. Id. at 36, 358 S.E.2d at 398.
84. 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1983).
85. Id. at 80.
86. Id. (quoting Neal v. Huntington Publishing Co., 159 W. Va. 556, 223 S.E.2d 792
(1976)). See also Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Wandt v. Hearst's Chicago
Am., 129 Wis. 419, 109 N.W. 70 (1906).
87. 293 S.C. at 39, 358 S.E.2d at 400.
252 [Vol. 40
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 16
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss1/16
This decision was based on "circumstantial evidence that a third
party could have heard the defamatory remarks and understood
them to refer to the plaintiff.""" Because the broadcast was
shown five times, the court upheld the finding of publication to
a third party. 9
By adopting the reasoning of the West Virginia court in
Crump, the South Carolina Court of Appeals took a logical and
consistent step forward in the development of libel and slander
law in South Carolina. In addition to the two South Carolina
cases cited by the court,90 there is ample authority in South Car-
olina and other jurisdictions supporting the direction taken in
Wilhoit.
Although Crump and Wilhoit have remarkably similar fac-
tual settings,91 one distinction between the two deserves consid-
eration. The plaintiff was easily recognizable in Crump, whereas
in Wilhoit the plaintiff covered her face with her hands in such
a way that she may or may not have been recognizable. This fact
was the basis of a major argument advanced by the defendant
with respect to whether a third person understood the broadcast
to refer to plaintiff-an element necessary in proving
defamation.92
The court abruptly resolved the issue in respondent's favor,
relying on Duckworth v. First National Bank,es which held that
the question of publication may be submitted to a jury upon cir-
88. Id. at 40, 358 S.E.2d at 400.
89. Id. Additionally, the court addressed the issues of presumed damages, privilege,
inadequate jury instructions, and excessive punitive damages and resolved these issues in
the respondent's favor. Id. at 40-42, 358 S.E.2d at 400-02.
90. The court cited Flowers v. Price, 192 S.C. 373, 6 S.E.2d 750 (1939) (holding
that words spoken could properly be construed as charging the plaintiff with the crime of
larceny and could have been understood as that by those who were within hearing), and
Duckworth v. First Nat'l Bank, 254 S.C. 563, 176 S.E.2d 297 (1970).
91. In Crump the plaintiff's photograph was published with an article about
problems faced by women coal miners. Although the plaintiff's name was not mentioned
in the article, she successfully claimed that the unauthorized publication of her picture
in conjunction with the article amounted to defamation. 320 S.E.2d at 70.
92. See Kendrick v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 266 S.C. 450, 223 S.E.2d 866
(1976). The defendants in Wilhoit argued there was no testimony of record by a third
party indicating that he understood the broadcast to refer to plaintiff. 293 S.C. at 40, 358
S.E.2d at 400.
93. 254 S.C. 563, 176 S.E.2d 297 (1970). See also Pelot v. Davison-Paxon Co., 218
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cumstantial evidence that a third party could have heard the
defamatory remarks and understood them to refer to the plain-
tiff.9 4 Although the court reached a correct conclusion, the opin-
ion, on its face, is vague. The court could have clarified its line
of reasoning by citing precedent to establish the requisite
groundwork, thereby leading logically to the adoption of
Crump.9
5
Decisions in the majority of jurisdictions lend further sup-
port for the reasoning adopted in Wilhoit.e6 Many courts have
addressed the issue of sufficiency of identification of the plaintiff
in a defamatory matter:
[Courts] [h]ave held that it is not necessary that a person de-
famed should be named in a defamatory publication if, by in-
trinsic reference, the allusion is apparent, or if the publication
contains matters of description or reference to facts and cir-
cumstances from which others may understand that the person
complaining is the person referred to, or he is pointed out by
extraneous circumstances so that persons knowing him could
and would understand that he was the person referred to.
7
The specific cases addressing this issue have held that the
question whether a picture is in fact the plaintiff, or is under-
stood to be the plaintiff, is always one for the jury, whether or
94. 254 S.C. at 570-71, 176 S.E.2d at 301.
95. In an action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove "that the complaining
party was the person with reference to whom the defamatory matter was spoken." 266
S.C. at 454, 223 S.E.2d at 868. It must appear that the defamatory words refer to some
ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be understood by at least one
person to be the plaintiff. See Neeley v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 255 S.C. 301, 178
S.E.2d 662 (1971); Clark v. Creitzburgh, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 491 (1828); 50 AM. Jun. 2D
Libel and Slander § 645 (1970). As early as 1956, South Carolina courts held that to
support an action for libel the plaintiff's name need not be mentioned in writing, it being
sufficient that there is a description or reference to him by which he may be known.
Nash v. Sharper, 229 S.C. 51, 93 S.E.2d 457 (1956). These precedents, along with Flow-
ers, 192 S.C. 373, 6 S.E.2d 750 (1939), lay a foundation for the adoption of the Crump
rule that libel includes defamation through the publication of pictures or photographs
that are descriptions of the person they depict.
96. See Annotation, Libel and Slander: Sufficiency of Identification of Plaintiff by
Matter Complained of as Defamatory, 100 A.L.R 2D 227 (1965). According to the anno-
tation, although it is well established that defamatory material must refer to some ascer-
tained or ascertainable person and that person must be the plaintiff, "there is a division
as to the extent to which plaintiff must be identified by matter intrinsic in the publica-
tion." Id. at 233.
97. Id. at 233-34 (emphasis added). See also Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185
(1909).
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not direct or circumstantial evidence is the basis for jury deter-
mination.98 Thus, this decision is a sound one in that it conforms
with the modern trend.
In reaching the conclusion that both issues presented by ap-
pellant were properly submitted to the jury, the court legiti-
mately adopted the reasoning used by the West Virginia court in
Crump. Prior South Carolina decisions, combined with an ex-
pansive body of law found in other jurisdictions, support the log-
ical progression that the court made in Wilhoit in the area of
television libel and slander.
Lynda G. Wilson
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACTIONS WITHSTANDS CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Section 15-3-545 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina sets
forth the statute of limitations for any personal injury action
arising out of negligent medical treatment by a licensed health
98. See Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (jury question
as to whether article accompanied by a picture of plaintiff was of and concerning District
of Columbia taxi drivers); Ball v. Evening Am. Publishing Co., 237 Ill. 592, 86 N.E. 1097
(1908) (when defendant mistakenly published plaintiff's photograph in connection with
an article derogatory to the character of the person having the same surname as plaintiff,
court held that a jury question was raised as to whether persons reading the article were
led to believe that it referred to plaintiff); Squire v. Press Publishing Co., 58 A.D. 362, 68
N.Y.S. 1028 (N.Y. App. Div. 1901) (jury question as to whether the picture published
was in fact plaintiff); Woolf v. Schripps Publishing Co., 35 Ohio App. 343, 172 N.E. 389
(1930) (question for jury was not whether the publication referred to plaintiff but
whether the publication was calculated to lead persons reading it to believe it referred to
plaintiff); James v. Fort Worth Tel. Co., 117 S.W. 1028 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) (held that
an article with a photograph should be construed as imputing the billing to plaintiff even
though the biller was referred to by a name other than that of the plaintiff). But see
Brewer v. Hearst Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1950) (complaint was dismissed
since nothing in the publication or photograph of a man's hands, legs and feet identified
the person whose body parts were shown in the photograph); Knickerbocker v. Press
Publishing Co., 143 A.D. 138, 127 N.Y.S. 969 (1911) (held that plaintiff could not state a
defamation cause of action merely through innuendo that he was the person referred to
in the publication, when no one viewing the photograph and reading the article could
infer that, as the article stated, plaintiff had just been adopted).
19
Rogers et al.: Tort Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
care provider.2 In Smith v. Smith 00 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court declared this statute of limitations for medical mal-
practice actions constitutional in the wake of an equal protec-
tion attack.101
The plaintiff wife in Smith had sought treatment from the
defendant doctor during her pregnancy. During the course of her
pregnancy, the plaintiff had developed two complications" 2 that
resulted in the stillbirth of her child in September 1978. Subse-
quently, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, began to question the
quality of the defendant's medical treatment. Upon Mrs.
Smith's release from the hospital, the plaintiffs consulted an at-
torney regarding the possibility of a malpractice suit against the
defendant. As a result of various difficulties with successive at-
torneys,10 3 the medical malpractice actions against the defendant
were not commenced until March 1985, almost seven years from
the stillbirth of the plaintiffs' child.104
The lower court granted the defendant's motions for sum-
mary judgment based on the fact that the statute of limitations
had run.105 The plaintiffs offered three arguments in support of
overturning the lower court's ruling: 06 (1) the statute of limita-
99. Section 15-3-545 of the South Carolina Code provides:
Any action to recover damages for injury to the person arising out of any
medical, surgical, or dental treatment, omission or operation by any licensed
health care provider as defined in Article 2 of Chapter 59 of Title 38 shall be
commenced within three years from the date of the treatment, omission or op-
eration giving rise to the cause of action or three years from the date of discov-
ery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered, not to exceed six
years from the date of occurrence.
S,C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-545 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
100. 291 S.C. 420, 354 S.E.2d 36 (1987).
101. Id. at 424-25, 354 S.E.2d at 39.
102. During her pregnancy, the plaintiff began to experience weight loss. In addi-
tion, she carried her child a full month beyond the estimated date of delivery. Id. at 423,
354 S.E.2d at 38.
103. The Charlotte, North Carolina attorney whom the plaintiffs had initially con-
sulted referred them to a Rock Hill attorney. The Smiths met with the second attorney
in the spring of 1980 to discuss the possibility of a malpractice action against Dr. Smith.
The plaintiffs again consulted this attorney in September or October 1982. Thereafter,
they retained a third attorney in order to assert a claim against their former counsel in
Rock Hill for his failure to file a timely action against Dr. Smith. Their claim ultimately
resulted in the plaintiffs receiving a $45,000 settlement from the Rock Hill attorney. Id.
at 423-24, 354 S.E.2d at 38.
104. Id. at 424, 354 S.E.2d at 39.
105. Id. at 422, 354 S.E.2d at 38.
106. Id.
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tions, as embodied in section 15-3-545, violated the equal protec-
tion clauses of the state and federal constitutions; (2) in the al-
ternative, if the statute was deemed constitutional, then it would
not bar the plaintiffs' actions because the cause of action was
discovered and the suit was initiated within the statutory
limit;10 7 and (3) also in the alternative, the parties' contract to
render proper medical treatment was breached. 108 The first con-
tention, regarding the constitutionality of section 15-3-545, is
one of first impression for the South Carolina Supreme Court
and is, therefore, of legal significance.
To support its holding of constitutionality, the court relied
upon previous South Carolina equal protection decisions. Citing
Gary Concrete Products v. Riley,10 9 the court stated that in de-
ciding equal protection questions, it would give great deference
to the classifications created by the legislature; unless those clas-
sifications proved to be arbitrary, the court would sustain
them.110 The court further relied upon Gary Concrete to outline
the applicable standards for an equal protection analysis under
South Carolina law.1 '
107. The court clearly rejected the plaintiffs' second argument. Section 15-3-545 re-
quires that medical malpractice actions be commenced within "three years from the date
of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered, not to exceed six years
from the date of occurrence." See supra note 99. Since the plaintiffs had consulted attor-
neys regarding a potential medical malpractice claim against Dr. Smith as late as the
spring of 1980, the court held that the discovery rule barred their lawsuits that were filed
in March 1985, beyond the three-year statutory limit. 291 S.C. at 425, 354 S.E.2d at 39.
108. The plaintiffs contend that their breach of contract claim was fied timely
within the six-year contract statute of limitations as provided in § 15-3-530(1) of the
code. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976). The court, however, refused to
address the merits of this argument and held that § 15-3-545 pertains to all medical
malpractice actions, thereby barring the plaintiffs' recovery for breach of contract. Id. at
426, 354 S.E.2d at 40.
109. 285 S.C. 498, 331 S.E.2d 335 (1985).
110. 291 S.C. at 424, 354 S.E.2d at 39. In Gary Concrete, the court stated:
The determination of whether a classification is reasonable is initially one for
the legislature and will not be set aside by the courts unless it is plainly arbi-
trary. A statute may be limited to a particular class, provided the limitation
established is for a proper public purpose. Although the classification may not
be arbitrary and there must be a reasonable relationship between the classifi-
cation and a proper legislative purpose, a classification will not be sustained
against constitutional attack if there is "any reasonable hypothesis" to support
it.
285 S.C. at 504, 331 S.E.2d at 338 (citations omitted).
111. 291 S.C. at 424, 354 S.E.2d at 39. The court stated: "The requirements of equal
protection are satisfied if 1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legisla-
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Thus, in order to withstand an equal protection challenge,
section 15-3-545 had to survive a two-prong test. The statute
must be upheld unless (1) the classification lacks a reasonable
relation to a legitimate state interest or (2) the statute arbitrar-
ily discriminates among members of the class.112 In addressing
the first prong of the test, the court recognized that the legisla-
ture enacted this shorter statute of limitations in response to the
medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s. The legislation was spe-
cifically designed to limit lawsuits against health care providers
in order to reduce providers' exposure to liability and to guaran-
tee the continued delivery of health care services at a reasonable
cost. Accordingly, the court deemed the classification of "li-
censed health care providers" to be rationally related to a legiti-
mate legislative objective." 3
Similarly, the court found that the second prong of the
equal protection test was satisfied. The statutory definition of
"licensed health care provider," as incorporated into section 15-
3-545,114 demonstrated the legislature's intent that the medical
malpractice statute of limitations apply to any action brought
against any individual even remotely connected with the medical
profession regarding any negligent medical treatment. Conse-
quently, it is clear that all members of the class created by this
statute of limitations are treated alike under similar circum-
stances and conditions."
5
As the court noted, numerous other jurisdictions have up-
held the constitutionality of shorter statutes of limitations for
medical malpractice actions against equal protection attacks." I6
tive purpose sought to be effected; 2) the members of the class are treated alike under
similar circumstances and conditions; and 3) the classification rests on some reasonable
basis." Id.
112. Brief of Respondent at 5.
113. Id. at 5-6.
114. Section 38-59-110 of the South Carolina Code provides: "'Licensed health care
providers' means physicians and surgeons; directors, officers and trustees of hospitals;
nurses, oral surgeons; dentists; pharmacists; chiropractors; hospitals; nursing homes; or
any similar category of licensed health care providers." S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-110 (Law.
Co-op. 1976).
115. Brief of Respondent at 8-9.
116. See Sellers v. Edwards, 289 Ala. 2, 265 So. 2d 438 (1972); Hamby v. Neurologi-
cal Assocs., 243 Ga. 698, 256 S.E.2d 378 (1979) (per curiam); Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill.
2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979), appeal dismissed sub nom. Woodward v. Burnham City
Hosp., 449 U.S. 807 (1980); Carmichael v. Silbert, 422 N.E.2d 1330 (Ind. App. 1981);
Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 631 P.2d 222 (1981); Taylor v. Karrer,
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Clearly, South Carolina is in the majority nationwide. The court
appears to have relied upon the decision in Roberts v. Durham
County Hospital Corp.,117 in which the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that a statute of limitations similar to the South
Carolina version was enacted as a legitimate response to the
medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s. The court pointed out
that health care providers were faced with dramatically in-
creased malpractice insurance rates to such an extent that many
medical personnel were forced to cut back or even cease offering
their services. The Roberts court, therefore, held that the
shorter statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions
was rationally related to the legislative purpose of lowering mal-
practice insurance rates and of providing adequate, reasonable
medical care to the public.18
The plaintiffs in Smith contended, however, that the court
should not apply the "rational basis" test but instead should ap-
ply the higher "strict scrutiny" standard, under which a compel-
ling state interest, rather than a legitimate state interest, must
be shown in order to uphold the statute against an equal protec-
tion challenge. The plaintiffs argued that their right to sue for
damages for personal injury was a "fundamental right."1 9 The
court, relying on its ruling in Bauer v. South Carolina State
Housing Authority,"20 rejected the plaintiffs' arguments.
In fact, as the lower court noted, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals previously has rejected arguments similar to those
proffered by the plaintiffs.121 In DiAntonio v. Northampton-Ac-
196 Neb. 581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976); Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245
(Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); Roberts v. Durham County Hosp., 56
N.C. App. 533, 289 S.E.2d 875 (1982), afl'd per curiam, 307 N.C. 533, 289 S.E.2d 875
(1983); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978); Duffy v. King Chiropractic
Clinic, 17 Wash. App. 693, 565 P.2d 435 (1977).
117. 56 N.C. App. 533, 289 S.E.2d 875 (1982), azf'd per curiam, 307 N.C. App. 533,
298 S.E.2d 384 (1983).
118. 56 N.C. App. at 540, 289 S.E.2d at 879.
119. Brief of Appellant at 4.
120. 271 S.C. 219, 246 S.E.2d 869 (1978). The Bauer court held:
Unless some suspect criteria, such as race, is involved, it is elementary that- the
equal protection provisions are satisfied if the classification bears a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate state interest which the Legislature seeks to effect
and the constituents of each class are treated alike under similar circumstances
and conditions . ..
Id. at 235-36, 246 S.E.2d at 878.
121. Record at 82.
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camack Memorial Hospital,122 the court of appeals applied the
"rational basis" test in upholding differential treatment for
medical malpractice litigants. In so doing, the court held that no
suspect classification or fundamental right was involved that
would necessitate the use of the "strict scrutiny" test.123 Clearly,
as illustrated by precedent, no suspect class was involved in the
instant case and no fundamental rights were at issue; therefore,
the plaintiffs' arguments for a "strict scrutiny" standard were
unfounded.
The supreme court's decision in Smith v. Smith places
South Carolina in the mainstream of national jurisprudence re-
garding a shorter statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions. The statute was clearly a legitimate exercise of legisla-
tive power in response to a critical issue of public concern and
was duly upheld as constitutional by the court.
Andrew F. Lindemann
VII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY SHIELDS GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
FROM TORT CLAIMS ARISING BEFORE JULY 1, 1986
Brabham v. City of Columbia124 and Taylor v. Murphy12
are the first supreme court decisions to interpret the doctrine of
sovereign immunity under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act
(Act.)120 In both cases the court held that sovereign immunity
shields an uninsured governmental entity from any tort claim
arising before July 1, 1986, regardless of when the suit is filed. 27
In 1820 Young v. Commissioners of Roads 28 became the
first South Carolina case to adopt sovereign immunity.2  De-
spite criticism, South Carolina courts continued to apply the
doctrine until 1985 when the supreme court abolished it in Mc-
Call v. Batson.130 According to McCall, sovereign immunity
122. 628 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1980).
123. Id. at 291.
124. 293 S.C. 266, 360 S.E.2d 144 (1987).
125. 293 S.C. 316, 360 S.E.2d 314 (1987).
126. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). Since Brabham
and Taylor, the Act has been amended. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
127. 293 S.C. at 267-68, 360 S.E.2d at 144; 293 S.C. at 319, 360 S.E.2d at 316.
128. 11 S.C.L. 215 (2 Nott & McC. 537) (1820).
129. See 285 S.C. at 255, 329 S.E.2d at 747 (Appendix A).
130. Id. at 246, 329 S.E.2d at 742-43. Sovereign immunity will not bar recovery in
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would not "apply to any case filed after July 1, 1986. "131 Shortly
thereafter, the South Carolina General Assembly essentially
codified McCall in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.132 The
Act reinstated sovereign immunity for any cause of action aris-
ing before July 1, 1986, provided "that sovereign immunity
[would] not bar recovery in any case filed on or before July 1,
1986, if the defendant maintained liability insurance
coverage." 133
Two months after the Act took effect, however, the supreme
court "clarified" McCall in Moore v. Berkely County.
134 Al-
though McCall suggests that the sovereign immunity defense
may be avoided by filing the claim after July 1, 1986, Moore
held that sovereign immunity will bar a claim for any incident
that arose prior to July 1, 1986, unless the defendant maintained
liability insurance coverage.
1 35
Unfortunately, the plaintiff in Brabham was prevented from
suing the defendant, City of Columbia (City), despite his good
faith reliance on McCall.13 6 Two weeks after the 1985 McCall
decision, Brabham was injured when a City vehicle struck his
automobile.3 7 Before the year ended, Taylor and Mobley, in two
unrelated accidents, also were injured in automobile collisions
with City vehicles. 3 8 Filing their claims before the Act took ef-
fect,139 Taylor and Mobley sued the City under the South Caro-
any case "filed on or before July 1, 1986, provided the defendant has liability insurance
coverage." Id., 329 S.E.2d at 743 (emphasis added). Recovery is limited to the extent of
such coverage. Id.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); see also 293
S.C. at 317, 360 S.E.2d at 315 ("[The Act codifies] the McCall v. Batson ruling."). Unlike
McCall, however, the Act allowed recovery for any tort claims arising, rather than filed,
after July 1, 1986. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
133. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-20(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (amended March 16,
1987) (emphasis added).
134. 290 S.C. 43, 348 S.E.2d 174 (1986). For a thorough analysis of Moore, see Torts,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 39 S.C.L. REv. 198 (1987).
135. 290 S.C. at 45, 348 S.E.2d at 176. The court, however, expressed no opinion
about the Act. Id. at 45 n.2, 348 S.E.2d at 176 n.2.
136. 293 S.C. at 267, 360 S.E.2d at 144; see also 293 S.C. at 318, 360 S.E.2d at 314.
137. 293 S.C. at 267, 360 S.E.2d at 144.
138. 293 S.C. at 317, 360 S.E.2d at 315. Taylor was injured on May 23, 1985. Mobley
was injured on December 13, 1985. These two cases were consolidated for appeal. Id.
139. Id. Taylor filed in November of 1985, and Mobley fied his claim in May of
1986. The Act became effective on July 1, 1986. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-20 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1986). Section 15-78-20(c), which relates to those causes of action arising prior to
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lina Governmental Motor Vehicle Act.140 Relying on the ruling
in McCall, however, Brabham waited until July 2, 1986, to file
his claim against the city.14 1 Nevertheless, in both cases the
court held that the city was entitled to sovereign immunity be-
cause the accidents occurred before July 1, 1986, and because
the City did not have liability insurance coverage. 4 2
In Taylor the plaintiffs believed that the Motor Vehicle
Tort Claims Act would apply regardless of the confusion of the
new Act. The supreme court, however, interpreted the Act as
retroactively "repeal[ing] the limited exception to sovereign im-
munity formerly contained in the Governmental Motor Vehicle
Torts Claims Act."" 4s Accordingly, unless the governmental en-
tity maintained liability insurance coverage at the time of the
alleged incident, the Act absolutely reinstated sovereign immu-
nity for those causes of action that arose prior to July 1, 1986.144
Therefore, because the City did not maintain liability insurance
coverage at the time of the accident, the Act barred recovery."1
5
Brabham argued that McCall eliminated sovereign immu-
nity as a defense for any tort claim fied after July 1, 1986.146
Nevertheless, the supreme court, in accordance with Moore, held
that the date the incident occurred, not the date of filing, deter-
mined the applicability of the sovereign immunity defense. 147
Therefore, since the accident occurred in May 1985, over a year
before the Act took effect, sovereign immunity barred
Brabham's suit."
48
After Brabham and Taylor, the General Assembly amended
the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (Amended Act). 149 The orig-
inal Act apparently allowed a governmental entity to assert the
sovereign immunity defense for an incident occurring prior to
July 1, 1986 - even when the entity maintained liability insur-
July 1, 1986, became effective op June 3, 1986. Id. (History).
140. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-77-210 to -250 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986) (re-
pealed July 1, 1986).
141. 293 S.C. at 267, 360 S.E.2d at 144. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
142. 293 S.C. at 267-68, 360 S.E.2d at 144; 293 S.E.2d at 319, 360 S.E.2d at 314.
143. 293 S.C. at 318, 360 S.E.2d at 316.
144. Id. at 319, 360 S.E.2d at 316.
145. Id.
146. 293 S.C. at 267, 360 S.E.2d at 144.
147. Id. at 267-68, 360 S.E.2d at 144. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
148. 293 S.C. at 267-68, 360 S.E.2d at 144.
149. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -190. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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ance coverage - unless the claim was filed before that date.150
The Amended Act has resolved this problem by deleting this fil-
ing requirement, thus removing the last vestige of doubt con-
cerning the use of that term.151
Brabham and Taylor clearly indicate that sovereign immu-
nity will bar a claim, whether based on common law or a statu-
tory right, when the incident occurred prior to July 1, 1986, and
the defendant did not maintain liability insurance coverage.
Therefore, filing the complaint after July 1, 1986, will not defeat
the Act's clear mandate. In the future, hopefully, similar confu-
sion can be avoided prior to the filing of three lawsuits and the
enactment of a statutory amendment.
G. Scott Lutz
VIII. NEW STANDARD OF PROOF FOR SLIP AND FALL CASES
INVOLVING WAXED FLOORS
In Howard v. K-Mart Discount Stores 52 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals reviewed the standard of proof necessary to
show negligence on the part of a merchant for a patron's slip
and fall on a waxed floor. The court held that a merchant is not
liable in negligence to a customer for failure to warn or place
mats in areas where the customer slipped and fell, absent any
evidence of negligent material or application of wax on the floor
area.1
53
On December 24, 1984, the plaintiff Dorothy G. Howard
slipped and fell as she entered a store owned and operated by
defendant K-Mart Discount Stores (K-Mart) and sustained inju-
ries to her left leg and hip.5 Howard subsequently filed suit
against K-Mart, alleging in part that the defendant was negli-
gent for failing to place mats on the floor, for waxing the floor to
a "glass like slickness," and for failing to warn of these latent
150. Id. § 15-78-20(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). For a complete discussion of the
problem with the 1986 Act, see Torts, supra note 134, at 199-200.
151. The Amended Act now states that "sovereign immunity will not bar recovery in
any cause of action arising or accruing on or before [July 1, 1986] if the defendant main-
tained liability insurance coverage." S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-78-20(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987).
152. 293 S.C. 134, 359 S.E.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1987).
153. Id. at 138, 359 S.E.2d at 83.
154. Id. at 136, 359 S.E.2d at 82.
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hazards.1 A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for
$1,000 actual damages and $1,000 punitive damages.15 6 K-Mart
appealed from the trial court's denial of its motions for directed
verdict, judgment non obstante veredicto, and a new trial.157 On
appeal K-Mart contended that evidence of the plaintiff's fall
and of the freshly waxed floors was insufficient to raise a jury
question on the issue of negligence. 151 The court agreed and re-
versed the verdict.
59
In South Carolina, it is well settled that a merchant does
not insure the safety of its customers but, rather, owes its cus-
tomers the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises in
a reasonably safe condition.1 60 When a party seeks to recover be-
cause of a fall on the merchant's premises, however, the plaintiff
has the burden to prove that the merchant's negligence proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff's injury. Negligence is not shown by
simply proving that an incident or injury occurred; instead, the
plaintiff must produce reasonable evidence showing some breach
of duty owed him by the merchant.61
The court noted that Howard did not allege that she had
slipped and fallen as a result of any water, debris, or other for-
eign substance being on the floor. 162 The court further noted
that the plaintiff's burden of proof for showing a merchant's
negligence for a slippery wax finish on its floors differs from that
in a typical slip and fall case, in which the plaintiff must show
that the merchant had actual or constructive knowledge of a for-




158. Brief of Appellant at 3.
159. 293 S.C. at 134, 359 S.E.2d at 82.
160. See, e.g., House v. European Health Spa, 269 S.C. 644, 239 S.E.2d 653 (1977);
Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d 167 (1977); Wimberly
v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 252 S.C. 117, 165 S.E.2d 627 (1969); Young v. Meeting
Street Piggly Wiggly, 288 S.C. 508,343 S.E.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1986). The respondent based
her argument entirely on this premise. Brief of Respondent at 9-11.
161. Orr v. Saylor, 253 S.C. 155, 169 S.E.2d 396 (1969). Note that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur does not apply in South Carolina. Gilliland v. Pierce Motor Co., 235 S.C.
268, 111 S.E.2d 521 (1959).
162. 293 S.C. at 136, 359 S.E.2d at 82. The plaintiff has testified that there was a
light rain falling when she entered the store; however, she also testified that there was
neither water nor any foreign substance on her shoes or the floor. Record at 9-12.
163. 293 S.C. at 134, 359 S.E.2d at 82.
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plaintiff must show that "the owner was negligent in the materi-
als used to wax the floor or in the manner of application, which
constituted the proximate cause of the injury which could not
have been avoided by the plaintiff through the exercise of ordi-
nary care.1164 Concluding that the plaintiff had proved nothing
more than that she had slipped and fallen on a freshly waxed
floor, the court found that K-Mart could not be held liable for
failing to warn or place mats in the area where the plaintiff
fell. 65
In establishing the burden of proof necessary to find a
merchant liable for the negligent waxing of its floors, the South
Carolina Court of Appeals relied exclusively upon decisions from
other jurisdictions, particularly cases from Georgia and North
Carolina having facts similar to those in Howard.16 6 In fact, the
courts in a majority of jurisdictions have held that a merchant is
not liable in negligence simply because the plaintiff fell on a
freshly waxed floor. 6 '
Therefore, Howard v. K-Mart Stores is instructive as to the
plaintiff's burden of proof in a slip and fall case involving allega-
tions of a slippery, waxed floor being the cause of the fall. The
practitioner must produce evidence of the negligent methods
and materials used by the merchant in waxing and maintaining
its floor. The Howard court indicated that the plaintiff's burden
of proof may be satisfied by offering the following types of evi-
dence: evidence of defective materials or negligent methods of
applications, evidence that the previous waxing had been defec-
tively performed, or evidence of an accumulation of wax where
the plaintiff fell.6 8 In establishing this new standard, the deci-
164. Id. at 136-38, 359 S.E.2d at 82-83. The court stressed that the mere fact that
the floor was waxed, not the fact that the plaintiff did indeed slip and fall, indicates
negligence on the part of the defendant merchant. Id. at 137, 359 S.E.2d at 82.
165. Id. at 138, 359 S.E.2d at 83.
166. See Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 272 S.E.2d 327 (1980); Grimes
v. Home Credit Co., 271 N.C. 608, 157 S.E.2d 213 (1967); Case v. Cato's, Inc., 252 N.C.
224, 113 S.E.2d 320 (1960).
167. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 161 Colo. 271, 421 P.2d 472 (1967);
Kinchen v. J.C. Penney Co., 426 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Noel v. Buchholz, 411
S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1967); Asmussen v. New Golden Hotel Co., 80 Nev. 260, 392 P.2d 49
(1964); De La Croix v. Sanders, 219 Or. 494, 347 P.2d 966 (1959); Bowser v. J.C. Penney
Co., 354 Pa. 1, 46 A.2d 324 (1946); Rogers v. Collier, 223 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
168. 293 S.C. at 138, 359 S.E.2d at 83. See also Brief of Appellant at 7-8.
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sion in Howard v. K-Mart Stores places South Carolina in the
mainstream of slip and fall jurisprudence.
Andrew F. Lindemann
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